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Executive Registry

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27 MAY 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Director, DCI/DDCI Executive Staff

FROM:   
Deputy Director for AdministrationSUBJECT: Management Commitment to the Center for the  
Study of Intelligence

It is recommended that the question of management commitment to the Center for the Study of Intelligence be the subject of a future meeting of the Executive Committee. The background for this recommendation is provided below.

1. The Center for the Study of Intelligence was established at the initiative of the DCI, James Schlesinger, and with the approval of the Management Advisory Group, a forerunner of the present Executive Committee. The DCI thought that the Agency should have its own in-house think tank to reflect on the process of intelligence and to keep abreast of the best thinking in the academic world. He initially expressed the idea during a briefing given him by the Director of Training, and it was left to the latter to come up with a proposal to achieve Mr. Schlesinger's goals. The result in July 1974 was the Center for the Study of Intelligence.

2. The idea was to have a permanent cadre of three or four people ~~supplanted~~ <sup>emulated</sup> by officers assigned from the various directorates to complete research projects. Additionally, the Center was to sponsor seminars on topics of interest drawing on specialists from both inside and outside the Agency.

3. Under its first director, a senior officer from the Directorate of Intelligence who had served on the NSC staff, the Center got off to a good start. The caliber of "Fellows" on loan to the Center was excellent and useful papers resulted. The seminars also attracted favorable attention especially one on "Creativity and Ethics in CIA" that was held at the urging of the then DDCI.

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SUBJECT: Management Commitment to the Center for the Study of Intelligence

4. With the departure of its first director, the Center fell on bad times, in part because of directors who lasted only a very short time in office with the resultant lack of continuity. In addition, the flow of fellows into the Center dried up and the work languished. In early 1977, doubts began to be raised about the usefulness of the Center and its continued existence. Andrew Falkiewicz, the outgoing Director of the Office of Public Affairs, was asked to study the matter and prepare a report. That report was completed in October 1977 and is attached as Appendix A. In essence, he concluded that the rationale for the existence of the Center was valid, that Agency management should give it greater support and that the production of the quarterly journal, "Studies in Intelligence," should be a function of the Center. Mr. Falkiewicz also recommended that assignments to the Center be designated "DCI Fellowships" and be processed through the Training Selection Board to give them more stature.

5. DCI Turner accepted the recommendations of the report on 13 February 1978 and made a few additional suggestions of his own for strengthening the Center. For example, he wanted the fellowships expanded outside the Agency (Appendix B). Since that time a total of five DCI Fellows have done research at the Center and produced intelligence monographs. A sixth began on 1 May 1981. One monograph on "The Relationship Between Intelligence Producers and Consumers" attracted a great deal of favorable attention outside the Agency as well as inside.

6. In the same period the seminar program was reinvigorated. (See Appendix C, especially page 4.) Additionally, a permanent "Interdirector Seminar" was formed with a cadre of twenty-five senior officers meeting six times a year to discuss problems of Agency-wide interest. The situation also improved with regard to the length of terms of the Directors of the Center.

7. Five "Fellows" over a three year period is not a very healthy number, however, and after the initial enthusiasm following the DCI's expression of interest in 1978, the flow of "Fellows" has once again almost dried up. There are several reasons for this, the tight Agency personnel situation that has existed for the last three years being the most paramount. Related to this is the feeling among the more effective officers that a tour in the Center is not necessarily career-enhancing, especially at a time when the parent office needs every able person.

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8. Thus, we are now at a stage similar to that of 1977 when the question of management commitment to the Center is being raised again, this time by the Director of Training and Education. Although most senior officers when polled think the idea of the Center is a good one, few are willing to be pinned down on more tangible measures of support.

9. One suggestion that has been advanced recently by the Board of Advisors of the Center is that we return to a more flexible system for the "Fellows" whereby officers are assigned for various amounts of time depending upon the project to be completed (Appendix D). For example, an officer might expend as little as two weeks at the Center concentrating on writing an article for "Studies" or as long as a year to prepare an extensive monograph as has been the more recent practice.

10. At any rate, we currently seem to be faced with three options:

- a. Continuing the Center at its current level of activity, a level which the Director of Training and Education does not feel justifies its existence.
- b. Extracting a commitment from the Deputy Directors to support the Center by sending more "Fellows" to it and viewing such tours as career enhancing.
- c. Doing away with the Center.



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Attachments

cc: Chairman, NIC

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Report  
on the Study of  
the Center for the Study of Intelligence

AUTHOR'S NOTE

In the course of this study, I have interviewed and consulted some 50 officers from all four Directorates (pre-October 1977 Agency organization), specifically including all but two Deputy Directors and Associate Deputy Directors. The Director of Training and the Staff and Fellows of the Center for the Study of Intelligence have been patient, invariably helpful, and generous in freely providing all the support and assistance I needed. Many respondents, I am sure, will recognize the formulation used in the text of the report; as I had originally determined, however, there is no attribution, and any direct quote used is rhetorical rather than substantive. I have relied on my notes of conversations to document consensus, but no one shares the responsibility for the specific conclusions and recommendations which I reached with or against my respondents' advice.

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Andrew T. Falkiewicz

October 1977

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### TERMS OF REFERENCE

On 17 August 1977, the Acting Deputy Director of Central Intelligence authorized a study of the Center for the Study of Intelligence as proposed (memorandum of 5 August 1977) by the Director of Training. The study was accordingly begun on 23 August and completed on 21 October 1977.

The basic questions propounded by the Director of Training were:

1. Should CSI continue in operation?
2. What type of subject matter should be studied?
3. Is the concept of Fellows on detail a viable one for the future?
4. Is there a better way to staff the Center?
5. What should be the relationship between the Center and Studies in Intelligence?

Both the Director of Training and the Acting DDCI, however, stressed their desire principally for a wide-ranging objective assessment of the mission, function, and long-range viability of CSI.

At the outset, two considerations were seen as relevant:

1. The establishment of CSI in July 1974 was the result of serious deliberations within CIA resulting in management recommendations translated into MAG decisions and DCI directives. Throughout, the long-range nature and need of this activity was stressed.

2. Preliminary surveys in connection with this study clearly showed the wide consensus of support for the concept of CSI as an institution within the Agency.

Accordingly, while endeavoring to analyze objectively the entire range of issues relevant to the CSI, the study deliberately focuses on the question: How can the CSI continue and improve the execution of its mission?--rather than: Should CSI be discontinued? In the process, an

attempt has been made to reformulate the mission and role of the CSI in such a way as to reflect experience gained in the two and one-half years of operation and hopefully, also, to lay a foundation for the MBO analysis which OTR is about to begin. It is also appropriate to mention at this point that the study has concerned itself entirely with the research aspect of the CSI. The reason for not analyzing the seminar activity is quite simply that this activity, important as it is within the context of CSI and OTR in general, has not been affected by the major problems besetting CSI's Fellowship program.

## DISCUSSION

Since the early days of CIA, there has been wide recognition by intelligence professionals that there should be developed a literature of intelligence. This conviction was based on the realization that as American intelligence was growing to maturity, it was developing, not unexpectedly, from a craft into a profession. Yet, some of the characteristics of profession were absent. Among them was a systematic body of knowledge of substantial intellectual content acquired through the study of first principles, of fundamental questions, of terms and concepts, of mission and methods, and of limits of intelligence. The first step in the realization of this idea was the creation of the quarterly Studies in Intelligence. Many more years passed before, in 1974, the Center for the Study of Intelligence was founded as an element of the Office of Training.

Those who authorized and supported CSI as an entity of OTR saw it as a place to which selected officers from all parts of CIA would be attracted to reflect and write about "vexing issues" of intelligence theory, doctrine, and practice. There was general agreement then, and there is general agreement today, that the Agency and the profession of intelligence need such an entity. It was seen above all as an essential aid in developing and maintaining the sense of professionalism in the intelligence business. It should serve to enhance the sense of unity and shared purpose within a necessarily fragmented profession. Beyond that, it was foreseen and intended when CSI was started that the work produced there would be utilized in Agency training, published in Studies in Intelligence, and used in other appropriate ways.

Although left unstated in the original authorization by the then existing Management Committee, the intention was that work of CSI should be closely relevant to real-life issues in the Agency. This was not to be an ivory tower where abstract issues would be learnedly dissected. It was to be a place where top-quality professionals would be able to focus on issues of fundamental importance to their profession without being limited or inhibited in any way by considerations of day-to-day responsibility, administrative duties, or adherence to prevailing doctrine or policy. In order fully to safeguard this freedom of inquiry, no attempt was made to provide any kind of official mechanism for viewpoints

or recommendations contained in CSI-produced materials to be formally considered in the Agency's decision-making processes. The philosophy then and the philosophy now, as it was stated in many of the interviews conducted as part of this study, was that CSI's responsibility ended with the production of its monographs and seminar reports and that it was not only outside CSI's scope but indeed compromising to its independence to engage in any proselytizing activity on behalf of the views which its Fellows developed.

The record of CSI over the approximately two and one-half years of active operation shows conclusively that the intentions expressed in the founding of the Center have been fulfilled. The topics have been real and important. Time and effort have not been spent in abstruse or unproductive inquiry. The caliber of Fellows assigned to the Center has also been uniformly high.

What then is the reason for the difficulties faced by CSI at the present time? These difficulties are unquestioned in terms both of identifying topics of study and, more so, in being able to attract a suitable number and quality of Fellows.

Is it possible, for instance, that the number of vexing problems in a profession, which in the last several years appears to have had nothing but vexing problems, is finite and that, in fact, we have produced all the thought that is available or necessary on all the problems that are real? Alternatively, have legislators, journalists, and vociferous cause-seekers preempted the initiative in the treatment of these problems? These are valid questions, and they deserve attention in this forum.

Taking the second question first: undoubtedly, Congressional investigations and press probings, however extravagant, have generated an enormous amount of attention on such admittedly fundamental issues of the profession of intelligence as secrecy and morality. Whether recurring waves of publicity amount in fact to the preemption of legitimate and serious inquiry into legitimate and serious problems appears to be at least questionable. What is not in question is that, despite the format of Congressional investigations, for instance, there has not been adequate institutional expression of the professional view of even such fundamental concepts as secrecy and morality. At best, this view is composed of scattered statements at various levels of authority and at various levels of intellectual content, and is invariably

defensive in nature. One may ask whether these issues should not be approached in a systematic, vigorous way by some of the best professional minds in an environment such as we have at our disposal in CSI. The vexing issues of secrecy and morality are by no means exhausted or preempted. The DCI is forced to address these issues in his dialogue with the Congress and the public--an illustration of a proper challenge to CSI to develop professional intelligence positions on these topics. Another instance of alleged preemption is the so called "charter" for foreign intelligence activities; here too, CSI should be contributing--not drafts, but a systematic analysis of a principled professional position on the issue for the DCI to use as he sees fit in his staff mechanism.

Now to the first question: it is trite to say that in the last decade or so enormous changes have taken place in the function and processes of American intelligence. Whether we consider this statement to be simply a cliché of bureaucratic life or indeed a rational view of reality, it is clear to all of us that the domestic environment in which the intelligence profession operates today in a very real sense requires new insights, new understandings, and perhaps new definitions of some of our vexing issues. Thus, there are new implications and new meanings to be sought in such basic and familiar issues as:

- The relationship between collection and production of intelligence;

- The nature of bias in intelligence analysis;

- The role of intelligence in policy formulation;

- The relationship between the policymaker and intelligence;

- The relationship between consumers and producers;

- The relationship between technical and human collection methods;

- Strategic and tactical intelligence;

- Military and civilian intelligence;

- Ethics of intelligence;

- Relations with the public;

- And many more.

We need new answers to old questions, and all of them can benefit from the contribution of mature thought and creative analysis generated without the pressures and distortions of daily parochial concerns, without the imposition of orthodoxy, and without the inhibitions of organizational consensus. In other words, these are the kinds of questions that need to be tackled by some of the best intelligence officers in the Community; these are the kinds of questions with which CSI should be seized, and for the study of which it should have uncompromising support of top Agency management.

The concept of CSI (and, incidentally, Studies in Intelligence) requires, for its development and survival, a management stake and the organizational perception of a management stake for two essential reasons: (1) The justification for the existence of CSI is in terms of long-range policy support and professional appeal; consequently, it does not automatically acquire a constituency among the operational components of the bureaucratic structure which normally provide the underpinnings of a staff project. (2) By definition, CSI depends (as does Studies), for remaining true to its high fundamental standards and objectives, on the kind of partial autonomy and intellectual independence that can derive only from being perceived--by the management and by the organization at large--as an activity that has "support at the highest level."

The fact is that management at all levels (note: I do not include the DCI and the DDCI who deliberately were not specifically queried in the course of this study) continues to view CSI as justified, valuable, and indeed important. At the same time, management is now emphatically without real involvement in CSI. Putting the situation in crass bureaucratic terms, CSI still relies only on the momentum which was originally imparted to it by DCI Schlesinger's decision to establish it in 1974. Since that time, the intelligence organization of the United States has been subjected to unprecedented pressures and internal challenges. It faces more important decisions of a fundamental nature than perhaps at any time since its formal inception. In its wisdom, it has created within itself an excellent means for studying these vexing issues and at the same time giving the opportunity to its outstanding officers for the kind of post-graduate training that only a period of creative independent thought and reflection can provide. It may indeed be argued that the need for assigning senior CIA officers to outside training programs has decreased in the recent past while the need for more vigorous intellectual investigation of the profession of intelligence by qualified intelligence professionals has grown.

What emerges, therefore, from an overall analysis of the current situation of CSI is the need to question not the validity but the accuracy of some of the assumptions underlying the establishment of a CIA think tank. The basic assumption was that in order to survive and be useful, the Center must assiduously maintain the distinction between the pragmatic, objective-oriented management study or task force on the one hand and the intellectual and analytical approach characteristic of a think tank on the other. The Center has succeeded admirably in protecting its independence, and for that success credit is due not only to CSI and OTR, but to Agency management which has understood the categorical need for independence and autonomy--a considerable achievement in any bureaucratic leadership. The result, however, has been that, whereas most of us recognize the "catalytic" or "ventilating" or "illuminating" or even "provocative" effect of CSI output as evident and important, we also agree that CSI "has not shaped the way we do things at the Agency." Explicitly or implicitly, virtually all respondents pointed to the presumptive need for some form of linkage between CSI output and the decision-making process of the Agency. However, although the consensus on these points is very strong, there has not been a concomitant urge to devise a mechanism that would make CSI output better able to "change the way we do things at the Agency."

Inherent in the concept of CSI, and indeed quite specifically stated in the records of the deliberations of its founding fathers, has been the emphasis on quality rather than quantity. This standard applies equally to the topics of study and to the human resources, the Fellows, and it is in this latter regard that we see the real impact of the absence of an institutional link between the CSI work product and the decision-making process of CIA. It is not only the top management of the Agency that needs effective evidence that the work product of an element of the Agency is not entirely disconnected from management goals. It is also the individual, and particularly the kind of gifted individual that CSI needs, that must be reassured that his participation in a CSI project is not tantamount to a detour from the mainstream of his career. It is remarkable and certainly indicative of CSI stature that high-quality officers have been available to volunteer for a CSI Fellowship. However, without evidence of management's support, it is unrealistic to expect that outstanding individuals will continue to make themselves available. Indeed, CSI is already finding it extremely difficult to attract candidates for the coming year. Without the highest quality of its human resources, CSI cannot function under any charter.

Management task forces can come up with first-rate studies based on institutional consensus, but CSI output must reflect conclusions articulated by a single good mind and based on the soundest experience and judgment.

The solution must lie in a modified approach to the CSI modus operandi. The new definition of mission must be as insistent on freedom and independence of thought as the original concept was; it must be as uncompromising in stressing quality over quantity; but it must reflect a realistic understanding of the institutional mechanism that is essential to the survival of this kind of entity within a complex corporate structure where managerial accountability and career service considerations deservedly play a dominant role.

Finally, I have found it extremely difficult to formulate meaningful conclusions regarding the cost effectiveness of CSI; it does seem irrational to draft, at the end of three years, a profit and loss statement for an operation designed to have a long-range significance and impact. And, it is just as difficult to put a dollar value on an element of intelligence training as it is to price the worth of an intelligence operation. Yet, implicit in many respondents' uncertainty about the manner in which the universally supported concept of a center for the study of intelligence should be made to work is the administrator's uneasiness about an operation which does not regularly produce a quantifiable result.

I recall an incident during my service in the Federal Republic of Germany some years ago. One of the two or three major national newspapers had on its staff a writer of a rather light-hearted and very popular diplomatic column. The gentleman in question was a latecomer to the profession of journalism, but he was a count and bore a distinguished Prussian noble family name. I was present when one day two senior bureau chiefs of the newspaper baited the managing editor, questioning the usefulness of the aristocratic columnist. The managing editor heard them out patiently, and as they became more heated and more hard-nosed in their criticism, he said very quietly, "You know, gentlemen, our kind of newspaper can afford to have a count on its staff."

Every organization can afford to have some class, and the better the organization, the more it needs it. A corporate think tank is class. Virtually all major corporate bodies have one form of it or another, and if it is a luxury, then,

in the case of the CIA, it is a laughably cheap luxury. For the two full years of CSI's operation, the annual overhead costs amounted to, in round figures: staff salaries, \$67,500; outside speakers and travel, \$500; printing and supplies, \$2,000; for a total of \$70,000. The salaries of the Fellows (of whom, incidentally, each year there were 10) and prorated costs of space and equipment amounted to about \$365,000 each year.

To put these costs in some kind of perspective, one has to look at comparable figures for the State Department's Senior Seminar, or the State Department's Policy and Planning Council, or the cost of any one of numerous outside contracts that the Department of Defense and other national security agencies customarily engage in, or the cost of sending a couple of senior officers to an occasional academic conference in one of the outside private think tanks.

The question of measuring the utility of CSI is clearly one of deciding whether the Agency needs it, because there is no question that we can afford it.

## CONCLUSIONS

1. The rationale for the existence of CSI is as valid today as it was when the Center was established three years ago. On the basis of staff recommendations, DCI Schlesinger had termed the need for study and analysis of the intelligence process a major challenge to the professionalism of the Agency. The formation of CSI was intended to demonstrate Agency commitment to develop an intelligence literature based on the proposition that intelligence as theory, process, and profession merits rigorous study.

Today, the Center can fulfill this mission by defining its operation by the following parameters:

- a. Study and development of long-range issues of professional doctrine and institutional policy;
- b. Documentation of institutional memory with systematic rationalization of experience;
- c. Constructive use of informed dissent; and
- d. Professional enrichment of the individual through research, reflection, and articulation of ideas.

2. An early effort to develop a professional literature of intelligence was the foundation of the journal Studies in Intelligence. The establishment of CSI supplemented the largely historical approach of the Studies by the dual emphasis in the CSI on topical research and individual professional development through Fellowships and seminars.

The substantive separation of CSI and Studies in Intelligence is both artificial and unproductive. The Center and the journal can profit from sensible and natural collaboration without fear of submerging their identities, a concern which appears to have been raised in the past for reasons that have nothing to do with either the mission (common) or the functions (separate) of the two elements.

3. The work product of CSI, with its emphasis on quality rather than quantity and careful preservation of criteria for intellectual inquiry into valid professional issues, has been respectable and useful. There is wide

agreement that, at its best, CSI has justified the ambitious expectations of its founders, both in terms of contributing to the intellectual examination of the processes of intelligence and as a means of enriching the professional capacity of Fellows and seminar participants. In addition to documenting an institutional memory not available in any other form, the studies and seminars of CSI have served the vital function of identifying and illuminating areas of long-range interest, legitimate professional controversy, and needed change, in many cases providing recommendations for alternative substantive and managerial approaches. The manner of performing this function outside the chain of command, as designed by the format of CSI, has assured a more candid, uninhibited and constructive product. The opportunity for reflection, writing, and informed dialogue has provided at the same time the best possible type of senior officer training.

4. Naturally, the focus of CSI management and leadership has been the maintenance of conditions favorable for free inquiry, free from the influences of short-term administrative or parochial concerns. At the same time, however, as the academic independence of CSI became established within the Agency organization, the involvement of top-level management in the Center became progressively weaker and, more importantly, from the point of view of corporate viability, Agency-wide perception of a management stake in the Center has been almost completely eroded. Translated into realistic administrative terms, this means that neither Agency managers nor individual interested professionals have the necessary incentive to contribute issues or Fellowship candidates to the Center.

There is another aspect of this conclusion. CSI was established at a time when the traditions of professional pride and non-bureaucratism were strong influences in management decision making, and it is somewhat for those reasons that CSI was established with so much faith in its ability to prosper without any visible means of top-management support beyond, of course, the vital evidence of the fact of establishment itself. Now, barely three years later, the professional pride and high intellectual standards are still there, but the buffetting distractions of investigations and press sensationalism as well as budget and personnel restraints have brought about an atmosphere in which conventional modes of thought and management are more likely to prevail, and in which therefore, perception of bureaucratic orthodoxy is relatively more important to organizational survival. This comment is in no way intended to characterize styles of

management, but merely to reflect what the author perceives as a real deficiency in the organizational character of CSI, given realities of managerial priorities in this (or any) agency at times of organizational reappraisal and uncertainty.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

1. In general, there must be a reformulation of the mission and role of CSI, redressing the balance between academic independence (which is fundamental to the proper functioning of CSI) and institutional discipline of topic and candidate selection (which is essential if CSI is to remain in the mainstream of Agency activity and assignment processes).

It is clear that continued emphasis on the preservation of academic purity as a primary objective will result in the organizational atrophy of CSI. It is not enough to charge top management of the Agency with excess of benign negligence; CSI and management must meet halfway: neither the encouragement of free and bold inquiry nor the guarantee of absence of institutional pressures are salutary if they are maintained at the cost of isolating CSI and its product from the Agency's decision-making process.

2. The DCI should give urgent consideration to regularly using resources of the CSI for the study of topics of particular relevance to the development of overall Agency policy (as distinct from the general criterion of professional relevance applied to all CSI activities). By using the resources of CSI in the policy-making process, Agency management would strengthen its stake in the Center without endangering the basic concepts of independence and freedom of inquiry. At the same time, CSI would profit from having parallel research tracks of institutionally generated and individually proposed topics.

3. What is suggested is not the employment of the Center for DCI staff work, but the use of the Agency's think tank to make an essential contribution to long-range managerial decisions, particularly in the many unchartered areas of professional processes. For instance, CSI should be regularly called upon to contribute to the preparation of the annual DCI Perspectives; while the Congress is working on legislative charters for foreign intelligence activities, the Agency would be well served to develop its own positions with the help of some rigorous professional and intellectual analysis; "vexing issues" of secrecy, public accountability, ethical norms--to name but a few--continue to face the Agency, and can continue to be usefully illuminated through the work of CSI Fellows.

4. The DCI should reaffirm the need for each Directorate to carry out the process of awarding CSI Fellowships through the appropriate channels of career boards and training selection boards, in such a way as to document the importance attached to these assignments and to guarantee the continuity of a Fellow's career development at the conclusion of the CSI tour. It may be useful to designate CSI assignments as "Senior Intelligence Fellowships" or "DCI Fellowships" in order to indicate their comparability with assignments to the National Defense University, the Senior Seminar of the Foreign Service Institute, and other outside senior training.

5. The need for independence was recognized from the first to be of essence to the effectiveness of CSI, and the continued ability of CSI to function practically outside the chain of command (in an agency justly proud of its discipline and organizational integrity) does credit to all levels of management. While CSI must vigilantly preserve its academic freedom, top management involvement--the lack of which stands forth as the major threat to the long-term viability of CSI--must be assured also by a degree of organizational monitoring and feedback. In making this recommendation for more systematic contact between CSI and management, I express the belief that exchanges between CSI Fellows and Agency decisionmakers are as much an element of the think tank (and senior training) process as academic encounters among the Fellows or with thinkers from outside the Agency, provided always that the special contribution of CSI to the decision-making process is not vitiated by conference, coordination, or administrative pressure.

Suggested measures to be taken: (a) periodic inclusion of a CSI study topic on the EAG agenda; (b) Director of CSI to have observer status at EAG meetings; (c) scheduled meetings of CSI Fellows and staff with the DCI and the DDCI; (d) EAG (or another, possibly Community, group) to be specifically assigned the responsibility to apprise the Director of Training, the Director of CSI, and the Board of Advisors of institutional reactions to CSI output. The effectiveness of a CSI product, however, should not be measured by the criterion of immediate implementation.

6. Full recognition must be given to the communality of purpose of CSI and Studies in Intelligence. By way of a minor reorganization or, more accurately, a redirection of existing organizational ties, both the Studies and CSI can benefit. Reference is made here to the thoughtful committee review of Studies submitted to the DDCI last January. Specifically, I recommend that both CSI and Studies be

headed by one director, with the title of Director of Center for the Study of Intelligence, in cooperation with a Board of Advisors based on the editorial board of Studies as currently constituted. The members of the Board would be appointed by the DCI for a term of two years on the recommendation of the Director of Training. The most recent three retired DCIs would be ex officio members of the Board. The Director of CSI would be assisted by the editor of Studies and the dean of CSI as well as by a small staff as conceived at present.

The proposed staffing pattern is as follows:

GS-16 (or 17)	Director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence
GS-16 (or 15)	Deputy Director/Editor of <u>Studies</u> in Intelligence
GS-16 (or 15)	Dean of CSI/Seminar Coordinator
GS-10 (or 11)	Research Associate
GS-07	Secretary-Typist
GS-05	Clerk-Typist

7. While CSI and Studies in Intelligence each retains independence to pursue its assigned mission, both should give urgent consideration to areas of systematic collaboration to mutual benefit. For instance, Studies should plan occasional thematic issues, centering on CSI monographs; CSI should provide short-term facilities including clerical and research assistance, to individuals writing articles for Studies.

8. A systematic approach to CSI assignments should make it possible to arrange for the occasional presence at CSI of officers within a year or two of retirement. The distinction of a CSI fellowship should provide a welcome incentive to the individual; the Agency and the profession of intelligence would benefit from the important contribution of experience and perspective at the time in an officer's career when there exists a special balance of prospective independence and present responsibility. At the very least, a substantial and much-needed means of preserving an institutional memory is hereby offered.

9. There is no room for compromise in staffing CSI, and the way in which the Agency approaches assignments to staff positions is of course inextricably part of the way in which the stature of the Center, the importance of its work, and its place in the mainstream of career service will be perceived and interpreted by Agency personnel and all intelligence professionals. The burden on the Director of

CSI is enormous: he should be a person of seniority (to have easy and effective access to anyone within the Agency), broad professional experience (to provide valid judgment and guidance in the planning and execution of study), high intellectual quality (to maintain high academic standards of integrity and achievement), and dedication (because this particular ship will surely founder if the helmsman's attention wanders). The criteria should be equally high for the editor of Studies and the dean of CSI, and all of them must deserve and enjoy the full and active support of the Director of Training and other senior officials of the Agency. Both CSI and Studies have been fortunate in their leadership in the past. They need no less in the future.

10. CSI is currently located in a vaguely defined area on the 10th floor of OTR. Its quarters should be consistent with its standing in the Agency's training program, and an improvement in the physical plant of the Center would be an important symbol of accepted stature of the CSI, its Fellows, and its staff.

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APPENDIX

TAB A	Chronology
TAB B	Organization and Budget
TAB C	List of Fellows
TAB D	List of Monographs and Seminar Reports
TAB E	DTR Memorandum to Acting DDCI (5 August 1977)

TAB A

## Center for the Study of Intelligence

## Chronology

18 Apr 1973 At Management Committee meeting, DCI notes need for study and analysis of intelligence process.

7 Jun 1973 Chief, Senior Seminar, submits proposed response to DTR.

22 Apr 1974 DTR presents proposal to Management Committee; proposal is approved by Committee.

25 Apr 1974 DCI approves DTR proposal.

22 Jul 1974 Establishment of CSI [redacted].

Jan 1975 [redacted] named Director of CSI.

20 Jan 1975 First CSI prospectus circulated.

18 Feb 1975 First Employee Bulletin on CSI.

31 Mar 1975 Initial program announced [redacted].

Apr-May 1975 First research team assembled: Intelligence Support to Foreign Policy.

19 May 1975 First Intelligence Analysis Seminar.

2 Jun 1975 DTR recommends to DDA that Board of Advisors be formed.

25 Jun 1975 Board of Advisors named.

16 Jul 1975 First meeting of Board of Advisors.

Jan 1976 First monograph published (TR/IM 76-01).

12 Feb 1976 Second Employee Bulletin on CSI.

11 May 1976 Series of Seminars for DDO officers approved.

27 Jul 1976 First DDO Seminar: Agent Authentication.

10 Oct 1976 Discussion program on Creativity, Controls, and Ethics approved.

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24 Nov 1976      Director of CSI reports to Board of Advisors  
on Status and Prospects of CSI.

• 11 Apr 1977      Director of CSI detailed to develop analyst  
training; [ ] (CSI Fellow) named  
Acting Director.

25 Jul 1977      Acting DDCI addresses request to Deputy  
Directors for support of CSI.

17 Aug 1977      Acting DDCI authorizes study of CSI.

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TAB B

## Organization and Budget of CSI

### I. Organization

Under the original concept of the Center, its permanent staff was to be small, with the officers working on research projects to be volunteer "Fellows" on temporary assignment from their home components which would continue to pay their salaries. Eight to ten officers and four to six projects were envisioned as the maximum size of the Center operation at any one point. The Center was logistically subordinated to the Intelligence Institute of the Office of Training--the Institute being generally equivalent to a Division of an Office. The Institute, however, was never envisioned as providing substantive guidance and control, but rather logistical support and fiscal control for the Center.

Initially authorized six permanent slots<sup>1</sup> from OTR's staff, the Center never actually had more than four "staffers" and that only for a short period. In fact, the Center was staffed with director, secretary, and research assistant for its first year; director, seminar coordinator, and secretary for its second and third year; and lost its research assistant in the middle of the second year. Of these, research assistant and secretary are the only ones to have drawn OTR salaries, and they with the director are the only ones to have occupied the six originally assigned slots. Today, the Center is operating with a Fellow (on DDO salary and slotting) as its acting director, and a secretary (on OTR salary and slotting), while the director is working on a special project for the Director of OTR (while on an NFAC salary occupying an OTR slot).

Altogether, the Center has had 23 Fellows assigned to it, and 19 of these have left the Center either for retirement or to return to line jobs. Three of these 19 are still finishing up some loose ends on their projects for the Center, while four remain at the Center on duty.

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<sup>1</sup>OTR Slots BD-02, 03, and 04; FH-74; FQ-78; and BC-84.

## II. Budget

The Center has fixed and varying expenses which do not maintain any type of constancy. Assigned 5,000 feet of office space, the real estate costs at \$7.16 per square foot per year would equal..... \$35,800.00

Equipment at \$400 per work station per year on active work stations would equal for 1977 ..... 2,866.00

Outside speakers..... 0

Travel (and per diem)..... 1,471.60

Printing, supplies, subscriptions, and books..... 3,000.00

Staff Salaries one GS-05 paid by OTR  
                   one GS-16 paid by NFAC for three  
                   months, ten days  
                   one GS-15 paid by DDO..... and  
 Fellows' Salaries pro rated by months worked  
 in 1977..... 218,151.00

Total annual projected cost for 1977..... \$261,288.60

This compares with an estimated similar cost average for each of the first two years of \$367,300.

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